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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF' UTAH 
Plaintiff ~ Appellant, 
JAMES H. PO,VERS, ) 
vs. C N ase o. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF )' 
UTAH & SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants ~ Respondents. , 
10587 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT SALT 
LAKE CITY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The respondent Salt Lake City Corporation re-
spectfully petitions this court for rehearing in the above 
entitled action and alleges that the court in its majority 
opinion filed on May 10, 1967, erred on the following 
points: 
I. This court has usurped the function of the Utah 
Industrial Commission and has substituted its judg-
ment for that of the Commission contrary to law. 
1 
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2. The order of the Industrial Commission was 
supported by competent evidence and should have been 1 
sustained. 
3. The court erred in holding that the decision of 
the Industrial Commission was arbitrary and not based 
upon the evidence. 
4. This court has set a serious precedent with re-
spect to internal bodily failures asserted as the basis 
for workmen's compensation benefits contrary to the 
law of this state prior to this decision. 
WHEREFORE, defendant - respondent Salt 
Lake City Corporation, a self-insurer under the w·ork-
men's Compensation Act of this state, prays that this 1 
action be reheard by this Honorable Court, and that 
the foregoing errors of this court be corrected in the 
1 
interest of law and justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are accurately set forth in 
the majority and dissenting opinions of the court. Ref er-
ence to such facts will be made in the following argu-
ment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE 
COURT IN THIS CASE HAS USURPED THE 
FUNCTION OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION BY SUBSTITUTING ITS 
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE COMMIS-
SION CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The majority opinion in this appeal, in accordance 
with the contention of the plaintiff-appellant in its 
brief on appeal, has held that the Industrial Commis-
sion applied the "unusual strain" test in this case con-
trary to previous decisions of this court and that the 
court was only concerned with whether or not "an ordi-
nary exertion as contrasted to an unusual exertion 
caused the injury in question." The "injury in question" 
constituted disability resulting from arteriosclerotic 
heart disease which admittedly existed prior to the date 
of the alleged industrial accident. 
'Vhat the majority opinion of this court has failed 
3 
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to recognize is that the medical panel report of Doctors 
1 
Viko, Erschler and Crockett, upon which the Industrial 1 
Commission based its findings and order in this case, 
was entirely consistent with the foregoing principles. 
Thus, in its original and second reports the medical 
panel concluded that, even assuming that Mr. Powers ! 
suffered an attack of angina pectoris which was pre- i 
cipitated by his occupational activities of responding · 
to a fire alarm on the night in question, it could not . 
find that such an attack would be sufficient to aggra· , 
vate his pre-existing coronary artery disease to the 
1
: 
point of disability six months later. The medical panel 
concluded that his disability was the result of the natural 
course of his pre-existing coronary artery disease. The 
question before the Industrial Commission was whether 
or not Mr. Powers' disability was the result of occu· 
pational aggravation of his existing heart disease on 
September 25, 1963, or the natural progress of the ; 
disease. It was immaterial, so far as the medical panel's I 
I 
opinion was concerned, whether the anginal attack 
which the medical panel accepted as having occurred. , 
resulted from ordinary or unusual exertion-the medi· 1 
cal panel was of the opinion that such an attack was 
1 
not sufficient to ag,qravatc pre-existing coronary arter,lj 
ddsease to the point of total disability. 
Admittedly the medical opinion of Doctor Null · 
was in conflict with that of the medical panel, but the i 
resolution of such conflict is the exclusive province of 
the Industrial Commission and not the Supreme Court. ! 
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, Section 35· · 
4 
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1-85, Utah Code Annotated 1953, expressly provides 
that the commission's findings on questions of fact shall 
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to re-
view. The Industrial Commission in this case held that 
the occupational events of the day in question cti<l 
not aggravate the pre-existing heart ailment of the 
appellant. The ordinary nature of the appellant's 
activities on the night in question were mentioned by 
both the medical panel and the Industrial Commission 
in evaluating the causal relationship between the epi-
sode on September 25, 1963, and the onset of disability 
six months later. By its decision in the case, this court 
has abandoned its pronouncement in Purity Biscuit 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 U. 1, 201 P.2d 
961, that in cases where disease or internal failure 
causes, or is, the injury there must be a causal con-
nection between the employment and the injury. In 
effect, the bare majority of this court has changed the 
statutory requirement that an employee's internal 
failure must arise "in the course of his employment'; to 
a mere finding that such occurred in the duration of 
his employment. It was this very possibility to which 
Justice 'V" olf e directed his concurring opinion in the 
Purity Biscuit Company case wherein he stated that 
the problem of the Industrial Commission in those 
cases "where the disability or death occurs by an internal 
failure contemporaneous with exertion attendant upon 
the work or soon thereafter, is to determine whether the 
exertion was a causative factor of the death or injury 
or merely coincidental with the employment." He then 
5 
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came to the very problem here involved when he statetl 
at page 970 of 201 P.2d Reporter: 
"Where the exertion is comparatively mild 
and of a kind of work the employee has been do-
ing and disability or death results, then it would 
appear to me that the proof that it was a ma-
terial contributory factor to death or disability 
should be clear and convincing. The more mild 
the exertion, the more likely that the internal 
failure was merely coincidental." 
It 1s submitted that on the basis of the time which 
elapsed between the angina! attack in this case and the 
resulting disability (six months), the admitted pre-
existence of a deteriorating heart and arterial disease, 
the extensive family history of heart failure in the ap-
pellant's immediate family, and the admitted anxiety 
of the appellant during the time in question over his 
wife's health, together with the mild nature of his 
occupational activities on the night of the alleged acci-
dent, the evidence sustained the Industrial Commis-
sion's findings and order that the appellant's internal 
failure, if any, on the night of September 25, 1963, 
was merely coincidental with his employment. 
This court's majority opinion has clearly invaded 
the statutory province of the Industrial Commission 
and, in doing so, has necessarily classified as arbitrary 
the dedicated actions of the members of that commis-
sion, as well as eminently respected medical authorities 
in order to justify its interference in matters with which 
it has no legal jurisdiction. The substitution of the 
judgment of the members of this court for that of the 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Industrial Commission on such matters is nothing less 
than judicial usurpation of power which is as unjusti-
fied in state appellate courts as it is in the federal 
judiciary. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL C0~1-
~IISSION \VAS SUl'PORTED BY COMPE-
TENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUSTAINED. 
The petitioner incorporates herein the argument 
set forth under Point I. In addition, it should be pointed 
out that the majority opinion accepted Dr. Null' s tes-
timony as competent upon the very same questions 
which it claims are incompetently and arbitrarily 
answered by the highly respected medical panel in this 
case. If the opinion of Dr. Null, who never examined 
the appellant until long after the claimed accident and 
therefore based his conclusion upon the medical history 
of the patient as did the medical panel, is considered 
competent evidence by this court, then most certainly 
the opinion of the medical panel upon the identical 
questions is also competer:t evidence and the Industrial 
Commission's order based upon such evidence should 
be sustained. This court has long held that the findings 
of the Industrial Commission on conflicting medical 
testimony could not be disturbed on appeal even though 
the Supreme Court might have come to a different con-
clusion. Campbell v. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Com-
prmy, 64 U. 430, 231 P. 620. 
7 
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POINT III 
This court on many occasions has held that a finding 
of arbitrariness on the part of the Industrial Commis-
sion cannot be made by the Supreme Court unless it 
appears from the record that the Industrial Commis· 
sion has disregarded uncontradicted evidence, substan· 
tial in character. Batchelor v. Industrial Commission, 
86 U. 261, 42 P.2d 996; Banks v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 74 U. 166, 278 P. 58; Harness v. Industrial Com-
mission, 81 U. 276, 17 P.2d 277; Milkovich v. Industrial 
CommisS'ion, 91 U. 498, 64 P.2d 1290; Norris v. In-
dustrial Commission, 90 U. 256, 61 P.2d 413. Thus, in 
the Milkovich case, the court stated as follows in head-
note 3: 
"Supreme Court will ordinarily reverse con-
clusion of Industrial Commission as arbitrary 
only where evidence is uncontradicted, * * * ." 
The importance of the Commission's disregarding un-
contradicted evidence in order for the Supreme Court 
to find that it acted arbitrary or capriciously is graph· 
ically detailed in the following statement of the court 
in the Norris case (page 415 of 61 P.2d Reporter): 
"Where the matter presented on appeal is the 
question of whether the commission should have 
in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different 
from that at which it did arrive from the evi-
dence, a question of law is presented only when 
it is claimed that the commission could only 
arrive at one conclusion from the evidence, and 
that it found contrarv to that inevitable con· 
clusion. But in order to reverse the commission 
8 
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in this regard it must appear at least that (a) 
the evidence is uncontradicted, and ( b) there is 
nothing in the record which is intrinsically dis-
crediting to the uncontradicted testimony and 
( c) that the uncontradicted evidence is not 
wholly that of interested witnesses or, if the 
unmntradicted evidence is wholly or partly from 
others than interested witnesses, that the record 
shows no bias or prejudice on the part of such 
other witnesses, and ( d) the uncontradicted 
evidence is such as to carry a measure of convic-
tion to the reasonable mind and sustain the bur-
den of proof, and ( e) precludes any other ex-
planation or hypothesis as being more or equally 
as reasonable, and ( f) there is nothing in the 
record which would indicate that the presence 
of the witnesses gave the commission such an 
advantage over the court in aid to its conclusions 
that the conclusions should for that reason not 
be disturbed. 
c, If the commission should decide a,qainst the 
uncontradicted evidence under those conditions, 
its decision tvoidd as a matter of law be arbitrary 
and capricious, which is another way of sayin.c; 
that it would be unreasonable." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
In the Banks case the court had a factual situation 
in many ways similar to this case with the exception 
that the evidence supported a finding of overexertion 
by the employee followed by his death eleven days later 
from angina pectoris or coronary occlusion. Two doctors 
\\'ere of the opinion that the decedent's condition was 
brought about by the heavy lifting he had engaged 
in on his work and two doctors were of the opinion that 
9 
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the alleged strain or overexertion was not connecteu 
with and did not contribute to the employee's death. A 
fifth doctor declined to say whether the overexertion 
or strain was a contributory cause in the case. In sus-
taining the Industrial Commission's denial of com-
pensation, this court held as follows: 
"The evidence that the employee was sub-
jected to a strain or overexertion was uncontra-
dicted, but that it resulted in a physical injury 
to the employee was positively contradicted by 
the opinion evidence of two doctors, and also 
rendered improbable by the testimony of a fel· 
low workman who was present at the time and 
observed the deceased employee, but saw or 
heard nothing to indicate that he had been in· 
jured. We cannot say upon this record that, in 
denying the claim, the Industrial Commission 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or without suf· 
ficient cause rejected uncontradicted evidence." 
Certainly, the facts in the instant case warrant affirm· 
ance of the Commission's order and should not be found 
to be arbitrary in view of the Banks case. 
By reason of the foregoing authorities it is sub-
mitted that the majority opinion has erred in holding 
the order of the Industrial Commission to be arbitrary 
when based upon admitted contradictory medical evi-
dence as to the causal connection between the appel· 
lant' s disability and the occupational events to which 
he attributes his disability. 
10 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT HAS SET A SERIOUS 
PRECEDENT \VITH RESPECT TO INTER-
~AL .BODILY FAILURES ASSERTED AS 
THE BASIS FOR \VORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION BENEFITS CONTRARY TO THE LAVV 
OF THIS STATE PRIOR TO THIS DECI-
SION. 
The majority opm10n m this case casts serious 
doubt upon the legality or efficacy of a medical panel 
study and report as required by Section 35-1-77, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Indeed this decision 
which has found the Industral Commission's order 
arbitrary when such order was based upon the medical 
panel report, could be forcefully argued for the propo-
sition that the Commission acts arbitrarily in any case 
in which it adopts a medical panel report whose con-
clusions conflict with the medical evidence offered by 
an applicant for workmen's compensation benefits. 
Such a legal result is patently wrong and constitutes 
further encroachment by this court upon the statutory 
prerogatives of the commission. Furthermore, it is sub-
mitted that such a result is contrary to all the legal 
precedents enumerated under Points I, II and III 
of this brief and will establish a precedent contrary 
to the statutory and decisional law of this state prior 
to this case. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
In order that this court may avoid the unjustifierl 
substitution of its own judgment for that of the Jn. 
dustrial Commission on matters which are exclusively 
within the province of the latter, this petition for re-
hearing should be granted and the order of the Jn. 
dustrial Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
